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United States v. Lambis: A Good Call for Cellphones,
Cell-site Simulators, and the Fourth Amendment
I. Introduction
Perhaps when you were a child, you liked to play this classic twist on
“hide and seek” with your friends. The “seeker” would count aloud to some
designated number while the “hiders” scurried about and jockeyed for the
best hiding position. Once the seeker rounded up a few of the other hiders,
the hiders would then begin to provide the seeker with clues to your
location—shouting “warmer” when the seeker was nearing your spot or
taunting “freezing cold” when the seeker was off searching another room.
Eventually the game would come to an end when you heard your friends
shriek, “boiling hot!” as the curtain you were cowering behind was
suddenly ripped open. Now imagine a technological tool equivalent to your
childhood friends that relied on your own cellphone to provide hints to your
location. If you are one of the ninety-two percent of American adults who
own a cellphone of some kind, this is understandably concerning. 1
Cell-site simulators—also referred to as “StingRays,” “Hailstorms,”
“TriggerFish,” or “IMSI catchers”—are powerful surveillance tools that
enable law enforcement officers and agencies to pinpoint a cellphone’s
location within a few yards.2 Just as someone’s shouts would drown out
another’s whisper, cell-site simulators drown out the signals of legitimate
cell towers and force cellphones nearby to connect with them instead. 3
Once connected, the information captured by cell-site simulators can range
from real-time location data to the content of communications. 4 Because
1. Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RES. CTR., Oct. 29,
2015, http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/10/PI_2015-10-29_device-ownership_FINAL.
pdf.
2. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), appeal
withdrawn, No. 16-3146, 2017 U.S. App. WL 4127919 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2017).; Cell-Site
Simulators/IMSI Catchers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (last visited Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators.
3. Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 2. “Cellular networks are distributed
over geographic areas called ‘cells.’” Id. “Each cell is served by [a tower], also known as a
cell-site.” Id. “Your [cell]phone naturally connects with the closest [cell-site] to provide you
with service as you move” around. Id. Essentially, cell-site simulators trick your cellphone
into thinking they are cell-sites. Id.
4. Id. Primarily, cell-site simulators target four types of information: “(1) identifying
information about the [cellphone] like the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
number”; (2) “metadata about calls like who you are dialing and duration of call”; (3) “the
content of SMS and voice calls”; and (4) “data usage, such as websites visited.” Id.
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cellphones are constantly communicating with cell towers even if they are
safely tucked away in an owner’s purse or pocket, the only way to protect
oneself from susceptibility to a nearby cell-site simulator is to shut the
cellphone off completely. 5 Cell-site simulators thus operate in a dragnet
fashion—scooping up data and information not only from the targeted
cellphone, but also from all cellphones that happen to be operating in the
vicinity.6
This Note will examine United States v. Lambis, a recent decision by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and
discuss the decision’s unfavorable treatment of the warrantless use of cellsite simulators by law enforcement officers and agencies. 7 Part I provided a
brief introduction to cell-site simulator technology.8 Part II examines the
landmark decisions that have shaped current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, especially those doctrines relied on by the district court in
the Lambis opinion.9 Part III describes the circumstances surrounding the
events that led to United States v. Lambis,10 while Part IV discusses the
district court’s decision.11 Part V analyzes the district court’s unique
application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to cutting-edge
technology,12 and argues that courts across the country should adopt a
similar line of reasoning. Finally, Part VI draws conclusions regarding the
current state of privacy and protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
and emphasizes why a novel approach like that found in United States v.
Lambis better safeguards the rights central to the foundations of liberty and
democracy.13

5. Cell-Site Simulators: Frequently Asked Questions: Can I Prevent Having My Data
Captured by Cell Site Simulators?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (last visited Mar. 23,
2017),
https://www.eff.org/node/89287#faq-Can-I-prevent-having-my-data-captured-bycell-site-simulators?.
6. Cell-Site Simulators: Frequently Asked Questions: How Does It Work?,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (last visited Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.eff.org/node/89287
#faq-How-does-it-work?.
7. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606.
8. See Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 2.
9. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 609-16.
10. See id. at 608-09.
11. See id. at 609-16.
12. See id.
13. See id.
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II. Law Before the Case
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Guarantee Against Unreasonable Searches
What began as a get-rich-quick scheme for one individual quickly
ballooned into a landmark Fourth Amendment case: Katz v. United States.14
Charles Katz was the target of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sting
operation in which FBI agents attached an electronic eavesdropping device
to the outside of a telephone booth Katz was regularly using to transmit
wagering information across the country. 15 Katz was subsequently arrested,
charged, and convicted; he later challenged his conviction, arguing that the
electronic eavesdropping device and its recordings violated his Fourth
Amendment rights and that the evidence gathered by its use should be
suppressed. 16
The Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches . . . shall not be violated.”17 Traditionally, this right was guarded
via application of the physical trespass doctrine, whereby physical
intrusions into a constitutionally protected area to obtain information were
regarded as unreasonable searches. 18 This theory has made a resurgence in
recent years following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Jones.19 There, the Court held that installing a global positioning system
(GPS) device on the undercarriage of a vehicle and using the device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements over an extended period of time
constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because
the government had usurped the individual’s property.20
The more modern doctrine, however, was first described in Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States and is composed of two
prongs.21 If an individual can show that (1) he or she had a subjective
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 348.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-06 (2012) (discussing the origin of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
19. See id.
20. Id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a
target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a
‘search.’”).
21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that
has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
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expectation of privacy in what was searched, and (2) that society is
prepared to recognize that individual’s expectation as reasonable, then the
search was unreasonable. 22 Because the first prong is more easily satisfied
due to its subjective nature, the Supreme Court more often focuses on
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in what was searched
to determine the reasonableness of the intrusion and whether it comports
with the Fourth Amendment.23
To utilize the physical trespass doctrine when dealing with electronic
surveillance would be an exercise in futility, as no physical intrusion is
actually involved in the invasion. 24 The reasonable expectation of privacy
test from Katz v. United States25 is therefore the appropriate analysis for
searches comprised solely of electronic surveillance—as confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Jones.26 If government conduct invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy,27 then the conduct is considered an unreasonable
search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 28 Under this standard, Katz’s
challenge was successful and the recordings from the electronic
eavesdropping device were suppressed. 29

be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). This two-step test described
by Justice Harlan, though applied in intervening cases, was not formally ratified by the Court
until 1979. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that
the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its
protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’
that has been invaded by government action.”) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1977);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
24. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411-12.
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”).
27. For example, the Supreme Court has held that searching the digital contents of a
cellphone incident to arrest and without the authorization of a warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014).
28. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
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B. Which Test to Use in Light of Cell-site Simulators? Making Sense of the
Supreme Court’s Myriad of Fact-Intensive Rules
Since the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the warrantless use of
a cell-site simulator invades a reasonable expectation of privacy and is
therefore an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, it is important to consider the myriad of fact-intensive rules
that inform the Supreme Court’s reasoning in such matters.
1. Knotts, Karo, and Searches Within the Home
One oft-quoted rationale of the Court’s decision in Katz v. United States
is that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” 30 This radical
departure from the physical trespass doctrine meant that anyone could enjoy
an expectation of privacy wherever he or she may go, untethered from
previous ideas that protection should singularly be afforded to places such
as a home. 31 Even under modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
however, an individual’s home is still accorded the highest degree of
protection when compared to an individual’s car, container, or the like. 32
This elevated level of protection is afforded because the very core of the
Fourth Amendment entitles an individual to “retreat into his [or her] own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” 33
Absent a few well-delineated exceptions, the search of a home typically
requires a warrant; without one, the search is presumptively unreasonable. 34
This is so because the search warrant requirement was designed primarily
“to interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between the citizen and
‘the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.’”35
Two cases—United States v. Knotts36 and United States v. Karo37—
illustrate this principle in a striking manner. Both cases involved “beepers”
surreptitiously installed by law enforcement in cans of chemicals expected
to later be used in drug manufacturing. 38 The beepers allowed law

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 351.
See id.
See id. at 359.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984).
Id. at 717 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
468 U.S. at 705.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276; Karo, 468 U.S. at 705.
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enforcement to track the movement of the cans over time and across
geographic areas.39
In Knotts, law enforcement tracked the cans as they were placed into a
vehicle and traveled along public roads. 40 While police were able to
maintain visual contact for most of the journey, they had to rely on the
beeper’s capabilities to ascertain the exact resting place of the cans once the
journey had come to an end outside a cabin owned by Knotts. 41 Because
there was no indication that the beeper was used to gather information
regarding the private area inside Knotts’s cabin, the Supreme Court ruled
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s movements
from one place to another when traveling on “public thoroughfares.” 42
In Karo, however, law enforcement tracked the cans as they were sold,
moved between multiple residences and commercial storage lockers, and
eventually came to rest inside a private residence. 43 This critical
distinction—where the cans came to rest—led the Supreme Court to draw a
definite rule that “[t]he monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a
location not opened to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment
rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the
residence.”44 In light of both cases, it seems the Supreme Court would
likely find a search unreasonable where an electronic tracking device is
used to reveal information from within a home.
2. Kyllo v. United States and Technology Not Commonly Available to
the Public
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court added another interesting
piece to the Fourth Amendment puzzle. 45 After Knotts and Karo clarified
that the Supreme Court was willing to draw a line between tracking
technology used within the home and that used outside the home, the Kyllo
Court took a step further to draw a “firm but also bright” line at the
entrance of the home in order to protect it from all types of warrantless
surveillance. 46
39. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276; Karo, 468 U.S. at 705.
40. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276.
41. Id. at 279.
42. Id. at 276 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements.”).
43. Karo, 468 U.S. at 705.
44. Id. at 706.
45. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
46. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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Danny Kyllo’s home was the subject of an investigation after law
enforcement agents became suspicious that he was growing marijuana
inside. 47 Agents used a thermal imaging device to record heat emanating
from Kyllo’s home. 48 The device revealed an unusual amount of heat
radiating from his garage when compared to the rest of his home. 49 Agents
then used this information to obtain a search warrant, which ultimately
aided in their discovery of a large amount of marijuana plants.50 The
Supreme Court, however, held that the use of the thermal imaging device
was an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.51 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on
the fact that the technology employed by the agents was not in use by the
general public.52 Taking the rationale of Knotts and Karo one step further,
the Supreme Court carved out yet another Fourth Amendment protection
whereby a search occurs when sense-enhancing technology that is not in
general public use is utilized to obtain any information regarding the
interior of a home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.53
3. Smith v. Maryland and the Third Party Doctrine
In light of modern technological advances, the “third party doctrine” is
one area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has a rather chilling
bright-line rule.54 In Smith v. Maryland, local police installed a pen register
47. Id. at 29.
48. Id. In order to grow marijuana indoors, a large amount of light is needed for the
plants to undergo photosynthesis, which results in an abnormally large heat signature. Id.;
see also Gina S. Warren, Regulating Pot to Save the Polar Bear: Energy and Climate
Impacts of the Marijuana Industry, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 403-04 (2015).
49. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 40.
52. Id. at 34-35.
53. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (“Where . . . the Government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of [a private] home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search’
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
54. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”); see also Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).
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on telephone company property to record all the numbers dialed from a
particular telephone in order to trace the source of menacing calls made to a
robbery victim. 55 Shortly thereafter, Michael Smith was identified as the
culprit.56 At trial, Smith sought to suppress “all fruits derived from the pen
register” because the police had failed to obtain a warrant before its
installation and therefore violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in
the telephone numbers he dialed.57 Like the trial court, the Supreme Court,
rejected Smith’s argument.58
In what is known as the third party doctrine, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information they voluntarily provide to third parties, such as
telephone service providers.59 Rather,
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.60
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, however, was handed
down in 1979.61 Is such a bright-line rule still appropriate in light of modern
technological advances? At least one Justice of the United States Supreme
Court is ready to ask the question. 62

55. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 745-46 (concluding Smith did not entertain an actual expectation of privacy in
the phone numbers he dialed and that even if he did, his expectation was not legitimate).
59. E.g., id.; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963).
60. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted).
61. 442 U.S. at 735.
62. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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C. Consequences of Multiple Tests: Confusion in the Lower Courts
Unsure of what line of reasoning to follow, courts across the country
have issued a dizzying series of opinions regarding cell-site simulators and
other related technology. For example, the Fourth Circuit recently held that
the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it obtained
historical cell-site location information from a cellphone provider without a
warrant because the defendants had voluntarily conveyed that information
to a third party by making and receiving calls and texts on their
cellphones.63 Yet, the Third Circuit disagrees with the idea that such actions
constituted a voluntary conveyance of location information. 64 And the Fifth
Circuit would draw a dispositive line based on whether it is the government
collecting the information or “whether it is a third party, of its own accord
and for its own purposes, recording the information.” 65
Similar to the Third Circuit, a Maryland court chose to simply reason
that “people have a reasonable expectation that their cell phones will not be
used as real-time tracking devices by law enforcement.” 66 Likewise, the
Florida Supreme Court has concluded that society is prepared to recognize
a subjective expectation of privacy in location signals transmitted by
cellphones.67 If anything can be demonstrated by the confusion among the
lower courts, it is that there is a definitive need for a clear directive on how
to apply the Fourth Amendment to cutting-edge technology such as cell-site

63. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit recently held the government did not conduct a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes when it obtained business records from the defendants’ wireless carriers that
contained historical cell-site location information. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880,
890 (6th Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Circuit has also held that obtaining historical cell tower
location information via a third-party telephone company’s business records did not violate
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th
Cir. 2015).
64. In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Comm'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A
cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular
provider in any meaningful way.”).
65. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013).
66. State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
67. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (“[W]e conclude that such a
subjective expectation of privacy of location as signaled by one’s cell phone—even on
public roads—is an expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to recognize as
objectively reasonable under the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.”).
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simulators. One case in particular, United States v. Lambis, just might
provide an answer.68
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
United States v. Lambis centers around a cellphone. 69 In the course of an
international drug trafficking investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) came to suspect Hugo Fernando Valenzuela Gomez
of brokering the movement of thousands of kilograms of narcotics through
South America, Central America, Europe, and the United States. 70
Accordingly, the DEA obtained judicial authorization to tap Gomez’s
communications.71 In the New York area, Gomez and his associates
allegedly possessed a large amount of heroin. 72 To improve the quality of
the heroin, Gomez needed hydrochloric acid. 73 “On or about August, 15,
2015, the DEA intercepted a BlackBerry exchange” between Gomez and an
associate that read, “646 894 4983 ‘patilla.’ It’s for the liquids.” 74
The cellphone belonging to “Patilla” quickly morphed into the target of
the DEA’s investigation. 75 Hoping to gather more information, the DEA
sought a warrant for the targeted cellphone’s pen register information and
cell site location information (CSLI). 76 The pen register information—"a
record from the service provider” that includes telephone numbers dialed
from the cellphone—allowed the DEA to approximate a network of
criminal associates using the targeted cellphone. 77 Even more illuminating,
the CSLI—a record from the service provider that includes location
68. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), appeal withdrawn,
No. 16-3146, 2017 U.S. App. WL 4127919 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2017).
69. Id. at 608.
70. The Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, Exhibit
A at 11-12, United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-cr00734).
71. Id. at 11.
72. Id. at 12.
73. Id. Based on her training, experience, and involvement in this particular
investigation, DEA Special Agent Kathryn Glover alleged that hydrochloric acid is
commonly used, often in large quantities, to purify lower-quality heroin, also referred to as
“street” heroin. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 13.
76. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), appeal
withdrawn, No. 16-3146, 2017 U.S. App. WL 4127919 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2017).
77. Id.
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information derived from “pings” sent by the cellphone to nearby cell
sites—allowed the DEA to approximate the general location of the targeted
cellphone based on its previous use.78
Using the CSLI, DEA agents were able to determine the approximate
location of the targeted cellphone within a few blocks.79 Within this small
area of the Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City, however,
were several apartment complexes, each containing a multitude of units. 80
The CSLI was simply not precise enough to trace the targeted cellphone
back to any single complex or unit. 81 Failing to first seek the authorization
of a warrant, the DEA deployed a technician with a cell-site simulator in the
location approximated by the CSLI in order to further narrow the targeted
cellphone’s location. 82
Calculating the strength of the pings intercepted on their way to the
nearest cell tower, the technician was able to trace the targeted cellphone to
a specific apartment complex.83 The technician then entered the apartment
building and began to walk the halls until he located a specific apartment
unit—home to Raymond Lambis—where the strength of the pings
emanating was the greatest.84 That evening, DEA agents knocked on the
door.85 After being let into the apartment, the DEA obtained consent from
Lambis to search his bedroom. 86 Ultimately, the search yielded narcotics
and paraphernalia that became the crux of the Government’s case, including
cocaine, three digital scales, empty ziplock bags, an X-Acto knife, and a
large plastic bag containing approximately eight cellphones.87
B. Procedural History and Issue
After his arrest, Raymond Lambis was charged with one count of
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance—a charge that carries a
prison sentence of five to forty years upon conviction.88 Lambis sought to
have the narcotics and drug paraphernalia suppressed and was ultimately
78. Id. at 608-09.
79. Id. at 609.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Complaint at 3, United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No.
1:15-cr-00734).
88. Id. at 1; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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successful by arguing that the DEA’s warrantless use of a cell-site
simulator to locate his cellphone within his apartment violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.89
IV. Decision
To begin its analysis, the Southern District of New York first
emphasized the Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness. 90 A few
sentences later, however, the court pointedly reemphasized that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable barring a few narrow exceptions. 91
Continuing, the court then highlighted the home’s “special significance
under the Fourth Amendment” before diving into current case law.92
The district court first turned to the seminal Supreme Court case Kyllo v.
United States.93 The court was especially concerned that the technology
presently before it in Lambis94 was the exact kind of technology the
Supreme Court warned of in Kyllo.95 Comparing cellphone pings to heat
emanating from a home, the district court observed that neither were readily
observable to “anyone who wanted to look” without the use of a cell-site
simulator or thermal imaging device. 96 Just as the thermal imaging device
in Kyllo revealed “details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion,” 97 so too did the cell-site
simulator.98
Rejecting the Government’s argument that the information gathered from
the cell-site simulator was only the targeted cellphone’s location and not
intimate details “such as ‘what hour each night the lady of the house takes
89. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 616.
90. Id. at 609.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.; 533 U.S. 27 (2001). To reiterate, the Supreme Court in Kyllo held that,
“[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at
40. In part, the Supreme Court rejected the Government’s argument because distinguishing
between “‘off-the-wall’ observations and ‘through-the-wall surveillance’” would leave the
“homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.” Id. at 35; see supra Section II.B.2.
94. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 609-10.
95. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36.
96. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281
(1983)).
97. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
98. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610.
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her daily sauna and bath,’”99 the district court relied on a Second Circuit
opinion that found such distinctions inappropriate even if they solely
revealed “the presence or absence of narcotics.” 100 In the case of
cellphones, the court concluded that an electronic search was “far more
intrusive . . . because, unlike narcotics, cell phones are neither contraband
nor illegal. In fact, they are ubiquitous.”101 Again similar to the thermal
imaging device in Kyllo, the court noted that cell-site simulators are not a
device in general public use. 102 Thus, the DEA’s warrantless use of the cellsite simulator to locate Lambis’s apartment was an unreasonable search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 103
The district court also supported its reasoning104 with another Supreme
Court case of monumental importance—United States v. Karo.105 In Karo,
the Supreme Court held that, “the monitoring of a beeper in a private
residence, a location not opened to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of
the residence.”106 In so holding, the Supreme Court spurned the
Government’s argument that if requisite justification exists on the facts to
support “that monitoring the beeper” wherever it may go would “produce
evidence of criminal activity,” the government’s conduct should not
constitute a search. 107 Like the Supreme Court in Karo,108 the district court
in Lambis109 strongly undercut this contention, fearing the exception would
swallow the rule as the primary reason for the warrant requirement is to
“interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between the citizen and ‘the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.’”110 Even though the DEA believed that by using the cell-site
99. Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
100. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a
canine sniff constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment “when employed at a person’s
home”).
101. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 611.
104. Id.
105. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
106. Id. at 714.
107. Id. at 717.
108. Id. (recognizing that “[w]arrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable”).
109. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 611 (“[E]ven though the DEA believed that the use of
the cell-site simulator would reveal the location of a phone associated with criminal activity,
the Fourth Amendment requires the Government to obtain a warrant from a neutral
magistrate to conduct that search.”).
110. Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
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simulator it would pinpoint the location of a cellphone involved in criminal
activity, the district court stressed that it was the role of a neutral magistrate
to make the call.111 The court also pointed out that whatever warrants were
obtained in the course of the investigation (namely the warrants for pen
register information and CSLI information), the DEA clearly exceeded their
scope by obtaining information via the cell-site simulator, which was not
contemplated by the original warrant application. 112
Turning its attention to another relevant Fourth Amendment concern, the
district court discussed the third party doctrine. 113 Disregarding altogether
whether or not the third party doctrine is best suited for the digital age, 114
the district court went straight to Smith v. Maryland.115 In Smith, a case
involving pen registers, the Supreme Court reasoned that the third party
doctrine applies when a party, “voluntarily turns over [information] to third
parties.”116 The district court, however, made findings based on two
observations that “the location information detected by a cell-site simulator
is different in kind from pen register information: it is neither initiated by
the user nor sent to a third party.”117
First, “cell phone users do not actively submit their location information”
to service providers.118 Rather, cellphones automatically send signals to
nearby cell towers to maintain a connection to the network, and other
courts119 have concluded that these passive signals do not trigger the third

111. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 611.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 614-16.
114. Id. at 614.
115. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
116. Id. at 744.
117. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
118. Id. at 615 (quoting State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 325 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2016)).
119. See In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Comm'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“A cell phone customer has not “voluntarily” shared his location information with a cellular
provider in any meaningful way.”); Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (“[W]e
conclude that such a subjective expectation of privacy of location as signaled by one’s cell
phone—even on public roads—is an expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to
recognize as objectively reasonable under the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
test.”); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641 (N.J. 2013) (citations omitted) (“When people make
disclosures to phone companies and other providers to use their services, they are not
promoting the release of personal information to others. . . . Instead, they can reasonably
expect that their personal information will remain private.”).
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party doctrine. 120 Furthermore, the district court pointed out that cell-site
simulators involve an additional layer of involuntariness as they force all
cellphones in the nearby area to repeatedly transmit their signals until a
location is derived. 121
Second, cell-site simulators do not involve a third party because “[t]he
question of who is recording [the] information”—a third party or the
government—is dispositive. 122 By using a cell-site simulator to derive a
cellphone’s location based on involuntarily conveyed signals, “the
Government cuts out the middleman and obtains the information
directly.”123 Put more succinctly, “[w]ithout a third party, the third party
doctrine is inapplicable.”124
Ultimately, the district court rejected the Government’s argument that
the warrantless use of the cell-site simulator to locate Lambis was
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 125 The court
suppressed the evidence recovered by the DEA agents from Lambis’s
apartment and quashed the Government’s case while warning, “[a]bsent a
search warrant, the Government may not turn a citizen’s cell phone into a
tracking device.”126
V. Analysis
Amid growing cries to constrain the government’s use of electronic
surveillance, United States v. Lambis serves as a shining example of what
courts across the country can do to better safeguard the protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment while balancing the needs of law
enforcement to control crime. 127 Marking the first federal ruling of its
kind128—namely that the warrantless use of cell-site simulators constitutes
an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—the
Southern District of New York’s elegant analysis in Lambis provides other
120. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 615.
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 616 (quoting In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
610 (5th Cir. 2013)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 611, 616.
127. See generally id. at 608-16.
128. Cyrus Farivar, For the First Time, Federal Judge Tosses Evidence Obtained Via
Stingray, LAW & DISORDER (Sept. 12, 2016, 8:07 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2016/07/for-the-first-time-federal-judge-tosses-evidence-obtained-via-stingray/.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1022

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1007

courts with a blueprint to construct similar safeguards and strike a careful
balance.129
The genius of the Lambis opinion stems from the court’s willingness to
borrow a straight flush from the deck of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
instead of merely playing its ace. For example, the issue of whether cell-site
simulators are devices commonly available to the public is certainly a
dispositive one. 130 If the district court had solely made findings that cell-site
simulators are not devices commonly available to the public, then a
warrantless search via a cell-site simulator is theoretically a search that is
presumptively unreasonable. An opinion resting on those findings alone,
however, would be a dangerous one. If tomorrow the makers of Candy
Crush Saga were to release a new iPhone application, “Cell-site Simulator
Saga,” the district court’s reasoning would be swiftly undermined. By using
each Fourth Amendment tool at its disposal, the district court built a sturdy
opinion with a strong foundation in case law.
The benefit of such an approach is that it makes the district court’s
analysis easily transferrable to similar cases, even those that may be
factually dissimilar. Was your client outside his home at the time law
enforcement used a cell-site simulator to pinpoint his location? Try the
district court’s line of reasoning regarding the third party doctrine. 131 Did
the trial court make findings against your client that he voluntarily
conveyed his location information to his cellphone service provider and
therefore the third party doctrine was triggered? Consider arguing that the
government’s conduct was unreasonable under the district court’s
interpretation of Karo.132 If other courts were to adopt an analysis similar to
Lambis, Fourth Amendment protections would clearly be the winner.133
At a time when society is struggling to strike a balance between the
legitimate goals of law enforcement and privacy protections, Lambis
demonstrates how to best address both concerns. 134 Largely unknown to the
public until recently, cell-site simulators play an increasing role in law

129. See 197 F. Supp. 3d at 608-16.
130. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ . . .
constitutes a search—at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general public
use.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))).
131. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 614-16.
132. Id. at 611.
133. See generally id. at 608-16.
134. Id.
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enforcement.135 While the public has become savvy of the government’s
growing reliance on electronic surveillance and several states have passed
legislative restrictions, courts should actively seek to adjudicate claims
related to cell-site simulators in a fashion similar to that employed by the
Southern District of New York, allowing law enforcement to rely on cellsite simulators only when prior judicial authorization is sought. 136 The
government’s unfettered power to assemble data so intimately connected
with a person’s everyday life through real-time location tracking via their
cellphone would otherwise certainly have a chilling effect on personal and
associational freedoms; indeed, this effect may be so severe as to “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.”137
VI. Conclusion
John Perry Barlow—a former Wyoming rancher, Grateful Dead lyricist
and co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation138—once cheekily
observed: “Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking

135. James B. Astrachan & Christopher J. Lyon, Cell-Site Simulators and the Fourth
Amendment: Government Surveillance, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (2016), https://www.lexis
nexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2016/11/08/cell-site-simulatorsand-the-fourth-amendment-government-surveillance.aspx. “[I]nformation about [cell-site
simulators] has been difficult to obtain because the government and its contractors have
employed non-disclosure agreements to make it difficult for the public to learn of even the
mere existence of the devices.” Id. For example, “the FBI . . . required both the [Baltimore
Police Department] and the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City to sign a non disclosure agreement” as a condition of use. Id.
136. E.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137 (2017) (prohibiting the use of cell-site simulators
without a warrant); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-32-2 (2016) (requiring a warrant to obtain
location information from a cellphone); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3 (2016) (instructing that
real-time location data may only be obtained pursuant to a subpoena, a search warrant, a
court order, or consumer consent); WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.73.260 (2015) (requiring a prior
court order in order to use a cell-site simulator); WIS. STAT. § 968.373 (2015) (mandating
that law enforcement must obtain a warrant to track or identify the location of a
communication device).
137. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J.,
concurring)).
138. Board of Directors, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., (last visited Mar. 26, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/about/board.
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a Peeping Tom to install your window blinds.”139 Courts should be wary of
the government’s intention to use citizens’ cellphones as tracking devices
without first seeking judicial authorization as cell-site simulators make their
way into law enforcement agencies across the country.140 Even though the
purchase and use of cell-site simulators is shrouded in secrecy by many
agencies, the American Civil Liberties Union has identified seventy-two
federal agencies ranging from the United States Navy to the Internal
Revenue Service known to have the technology. 141 Even then, this figure
does not include the dozens of state and city agencies (such as the
Oklahoma City Police Department) that also have cell-site simulators in
their electronic surveillance arsenal.142 Cell-site simulators, quite literally,
are coming to a city near you. As such, courts across the country should
heed the command of the Southern District of New York in United States v.
Lambis: “[T]he Government may not turn a citizen’s cell phone into a
tracking device.”143
Kathryn E. Gardner

139. Frank Verbruggen, The Glass May Be Half-Full or Half-Empty, But It Is Definitely
Fragile, in PRIVACY & THE CRIMINAL LAW 121 (Erik Claes, Antony Duff & Serge Gutwirth
eds., 2006).
140. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (last
visited Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them.
141. Id.
142. Id.; Clifton Adcock, Okla. Authorities Have or Use Controversial Cellphone
Tracker,
OKLA.
WATCH
(last
visited
Feb.
7,
2017),
http://oklahomawatch.org/2016/04/10/okla-authorities-have-or-use-controversial-cell-phonetracker/.
143. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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